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This paper investigates empirically the relationship between market structure and consumer 
prices in the supermarket industry in Chile. A panel of monthly data from 16 cities in the 
period January 1998–September 2006 was used.  It was found that the more concentrated 
the industry is in a city, the higher the prices, while the participation of major national 
chains in cities tends to lower prices.  Moreover, the dominant local chain was found to 
behave differently depending on whether or not one of the national chains was present in 
the city.  Finally, we find that prices rise when a national chain acquires another chain and 
both  were  previously  in  a  city  (inmerge)  while  if  only  one  of  the  two  was  present 
(outmerge), prices fall. 
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I.  Introduction 
This paper studies the relationship between the structure of the industry and prices 
in the supermarket sector of Chile.  It concentrates specifically on explaining how many of 
the differences in prices between different cities in the country are due to differences in the 
structures of the local industries. 
Conceptually, there is no unique relationship between prices and the structure of an 
industry because concentration is not synonymous with market power.  Concentration may 
be the result of the greater efficiency of major companies (Demsetz (1973)). Empirical 
studies seek to understand the situation in each particular case. 
Diverse international studies are based on observing differences in behavior in one 
same industry at different geographic points as this helps isolate the effects of cost and the 
nature of the global industry in the country.  Lira, Rivero and Vergara (2007) investigate 
the effect of hypermarkets entering cities in Chile on food prices.  They concluded that such 
an entry reduces local prices. Asplund and Friberg (2002) examined the food price levels in 
different locations in Sweden and learned that the relationship between market structure 
variables and food prices is weak. Nevertheless, higher local concentration of stores, higher 
regional wholesaler concentration and a lower market share of large stores are all correlated 
with higher prices. Focarelli and Panetta (2003) studied the effects of mergers in the bank 
industry on consumer wellbeing in different local markets and found that mergers benefited 
them in the long term. 
This study works with a panel of monthly data on 16 cities in Chile for the period 
January 1998–September 2006.  The central point of interest in this investigation is the fact 
that during this period, the supermarket industry structure in Chile evolved radically.  In 2   
 
fact, the domestic industry has been characterized by a clear trend toward concentration 
based on the growth of two major national chains (Lira and Ugarte (2007)).  Nationally, in 
this period the HH index rose from 0.067 to 0.205 while the two major chains increased 
their combined market share from 20.5% to 62.9%.  The large size that they have achieved 
throughout the nation came from their strategy of expanding to cities, either by opening 
new stores or by purchasing other chains.  The concentration in the domestic industry has 
not  necessarily  meant  a  concentration  of  the  industries  in  cities.    On  the  contrary,  the 
invasion of cities by the major domestic chains has had an unequal effect on the structures 
of the local industries.  Some cities have experienced an increase in concentration, others 
have tended to deconcentrate, while some have not undergone any significant variations in 
this variable.  Since no clear relationship was seen between the expansion of the major 
chains and the concentration by city, both variables can be separated.  As a result, the 
individual impact of each of these variables on local prices can be measured.  
This investigation finds that industry structure has an impact on local prices.  An 
industry concentrating in each city tends to raise local prices while the opposite effect is 
found regarding the expansion of major chains to cities.  The greater the penetration of 
major chains, the lower prices.  In terms of magnitude, this latter effect prevails over the 
former.  This paper also investigates the behavior of the leading local chain and finds an 
interesting situation:  If one of the two major national chains is present in this city, then 
local prices decline as the leading local chain increases its market share, suggesting that in 
this case, the behavior of the local chain follows that of major national chains.  On the other 
hand,  if  none  of  the  national  chains  is  present  in  the  city,  then  prices  increase  in  that 
location as the leading local chain increases its market share, indicating that in this case, it 
makes use of some degree of market power. 3   
 
We also find that acquisitions of supermarkets made by the national chains have an 
differentiated impact on prices: prices rise when a national chain acquires another chain and 
both  were  previously  in  a  city  (inmerge)  while  if  only  one  of  the  two  was  present 
(outmerge), prices fall. 
This  paper  is  organized  in  the  following  way:    Section  II  briefly  reviews  the 
literature on market power and economies of scale in the supermarket industry.  Section III 
presents the data, the model and the research methodology.  Section IV estimates the effect 
of concentration, the presence of the major national chains and the existence of large local 
chains on prices.  The effect of acquisitions on prices is analyzed in Section V and the 
conclusion is provided in Section VI. 
 
II. Economies of scale and market power in the supermarket industry 
International  evidence  shows  that  the  progress  in  information  technology  has 
brought about profound changes in the retail industry. It has signified an increase in the 
industry’s productivity and as a result, new economies of scale have arisen favorable to the 
growth of the major retail chains. 
Fernald and Ramnath (2004) studied sectorial productivity in the United States in 
the  90’s.    They  found  that  there  was  an  important  acceleration  in  productivity  in  that 
country in the second half of that decade in comparison to the first, going from a growth of 
0.91% annually to 2.08%.  The sectors with the greatest acceleration in productivity were 
finance (from 0.44% to 3.39%), retail (from 0.83% to 5.33%) and wholesale trade (from 
1.66%  to  5.37%).      They  concluded  that  the  cause  of  this  generalized  increase  in 
productivity lay in the progress in information technology and that the sectors that had 
shown the greatest increases in productivity were the principal users of this information 4   
 
technology.    Retail,  wholesale  trade  and  finance  were  the  main  users  of  information 
technology.  Rivero and Vergara (2006) found similar results for the case of Chile.  In fact, 
growth in the retail sector in the period 1986 to 2001 was 7.39% and the contribution of the 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) was 2.7 points, or 36% of all growth in that sector.  Like in 
the rest of the world, this fact was attributed by the authors to the intensive use of new 
information technology. 
The  technological  advances  directly  impact  the  operation  of  firms  in  the  retail 
sector.  Fernald et al. (2004) say that the structure of a retail company  is dramatically 
changed by the introduction of information technology to the industry.  IT progress results 
in increases in productivity in the retail sector because of the greater efficiency in handling 
inventories  and  in  logistics  in  general.    Through  data  scanners,  cashiers  can  charge 
merchandise  more  quickly  and  more  importantly  yet,  there  is  an  instant  control  of  the 
inventories of each product.  So, there is a greater productivity on the part of cashiers as 
well as savings on time in inventory management, resulting in savings on time in placing 
orders.    In  addition,  on-line  contact  with  suppliers  has  reduced  the  new order  delivery 
times.  All of this means that there is a significant reduction in the time elapsing between 
measuring inventories and receiving new merchandise. Ultimately, this technology is able 
to reduce the optimum levels of inventories that retailers must keep, since the greater speed 
of information substitutes for them.  This reduction in inventories reduces operating costs 
hence  producing  increases  in  productivity.    There  are  profound  implications  for  the 
company by the fact that the increase in productivity occurs in inventory management and 
in the company’s logistics. Technological progress in the manner described above signifies 
economies of scale as they lead to a decreasing average production cost structure, given the 
significant investment required in fixed costs.  This translates into a growth in the optimal 5   
 
size of the company  (Holmes 2001).  Nakamura (1997) says that the  number of items 
offered per store rose from 7,800 in the United States in 1970 to 19,612 in 1994.  Ellikson 
(2005) says that in 2004, that figure had surpassed 30,000 items per store, according to 
information provided by Food Marketing Institute.  
In terms of industry organization, this means a trend towards concentration as the 
companies that first implement these technological changes will have a cost advantage that 
will help them displace the others.  Therefore, they will gain market share at the cost of the 
others (Ellikson, op. cit.).  
Another interesting aspect of the impact of technological progress on retail is its 
effect on the dynamics of the industry. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002) study the 
dynamics of the retail industry in relation to the technological changes that have occurred in 
the United States.  In most of the industries, the entry and exit of companies is key to 
produce  the  transmission  of  technological  progress,  since  new  companies  or  plants 
automatically include the latest advances available at the time they are founded, which 
helps displace the less efficient ones.  So, the substitution of enterprises or plants is one 
way  of  including  technological  change.    The  authors  found  that  this  is  particularly 
important in the retail industry as virtually all of the technological changes are transmitted 
by new plants or firms while the pre-existing companies are incapable of adapting to them.  
Substituting plants in this industry is key.  This has heavy implications on the dynamics of 
the retail industry because there should be a major technological change when new firms 
enter the industry. 
In the United States, Wal-Mart was a pioneer in adopting the changes in information 
technology.  The McKinsey Global Institute (2001) attributed the aggressive expansion of 
Wal-Mart largely to those technological changes.  Wal-Mart expanded radially throughout 6   
 
the country, around its distribution centers, in order to take advantage of economies of scale 
(Khanna and Tice, 2000).  The hypermarket format was used to implement its strategy.  
Along the same lines, Yoffie and Wang (2002) said that a large part of the hypermarket 
success stemmed from the early implementation of information technology changes.  Wal-
Mart has been using the electronic data interchange (EDI) system since the 80’s while it 
implemented  the  Retail  Link  in  the  early  90’s,  a  computer  system  that  provides  sales 
information from each store to thousands of suppliers in order to improve merchandise 
dispatch planning (Ghemawat P., Mark K., Bradley S., 2003). 
In  the  case  of  Chile,  the  supermarket  industry  has  lately  been  concentrating 
nationally  around  two  major  chains,  Cencosud  and  DyS.    The  concentration  occurred 
because  of  those  chains’  expansion  to many  of  the  cities  in Chile.    This  was  done  by 
opening new stores and acquiring existing ones.  
Similar to the international experience, the main reason behind the expansion of 
these  companies  was  the  emergence  of  new  economies  of  scale  in  the  industry  as  a 
consequence  of  information  technology  changes  throughout  the  world  in  recent  years.  
Theses  of  economies  of  scale  have  enabled  them  to  expand  to  cities  and  to  continue 
operating with centralized distribution centers.  Those technological advances can be used 
in handling inventories and logistics in general (Lira and Ugarte, op.cit.).     
 
III. Estimation Model, Methodology and Data 
This paper seeks to evaluate the relationship existing between prices and market 
structure in the supermarket industry in different cities of Chile.  A simple model was used 
to  perform  this  analysis  where  the  prices  are  determined  by  the  supply  and  demand 7   
 
variables.  The variables are measured in relative terms against Santiago.
1  Therefore, many 
supply variables are discarded since a large part of the production process and the relevant 
costs are centralized and, therefore, do not differentially affect prices between different 
cities.  Ergo, the emphasis on supply lies in a variable that describes the particular structure 
of each local market: market concentration.  Hence, to test our hypothesis, we estimated the 
following equation: 
 
it t i it it it C D P ε λ µ φ δ α + + + ⋅ + + =        (1)       
   
Where the subindex i denotes the  cities (i  = 1, 2, 3……15) and the subindex t 
represents the month (t  = 1, 2, 3……105). 
 
The variables are: 
 
it P  = Relative price in city i with respect to Santiago in month t. 
it D  = Set of demand variables.  
it C  = Relative concentration index in city i with respect to Santiago in month t. 
i µ  = City-specific fixed effect. 
t λ  = Temporal fixed effect. 
it ε  = iid ( )
2 , 0 σ  distributed error term. 
  
                                                 
1 Santiago is used as the baseline because it is, by far, the largest city in Chile (with 40% of the population 
and 47% of the economic activity) and because by 1998, Santiago already possessed many hypermarkets, 
suggesting that the effects of hypermarket entry were long since assimilated (Lira et. al., op.cit.).  8   
 
  The dependent variable ( it P ) is the price of the bundle of 51 food products
2 in city i 
relative to its price in Santiago in month t. The monetary value of the bundle in city i is 














j P  is the price of good j in city i 
and
s
j B  is the amount consumed of good j in Santiago (j=1,2,…,51). 
s
j B is assumed to be 
invariant between cities and constant over the sample period; changes in the value of the 
bundle therefore reflect only changes in the price of goods. 
  The demand variables include income and unemployment, both relative to Santiago. 
The income variable is the quotient between the average taxable income in month t in the 
region in which city i is located and the average taxable income in Santiago in the same 
month.  An increase in this variable reflects that economic income in city i is growing faster 
than the income in Santiago. If the market is not perfectly competitive, a greater increase in 
demand would be reflected by higher relative prices in city i. In such a case, we would 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable. The unemployment variable is the ratio of the 
unemployment  rate  in  the  region  where  city  i  is  located  to  the  unemployment  rate  in 
Santiago for the same period. It reflects business cycle conditions in city i vis-à-vis the 
whole country. Under the same hypothetical circumstances that we considered for income 
above, we would expect the unemployment coefficient to be negative, as the higher the 
unemployment rate in a city is relative to the unemployment rate in Santiago, the lower the 
demand for goods, and thus the lower the relative prices.   
We use two measures of concentration ( it C ) to check whether our results are robust 
or  depend  upon  the  criteria  adopted.  First,  we  use  the  Herfindahl–Hirschmann  Index 
                                                 
2 These are the goods for which there is price information in the Chilean National Statistics Institute. 9   
 
( it HH ) and second, the aggregated market share of the two major supermarket chains in a 
given city ( it C2 ). 
The information used corresponds to monthly data on 16 cities for the period from 
January  1998  to  September  2006.    The  data  was  on  the  cities  of:  Arica,  Iquique, 
Antofagasta,  Copiapó,  La  Serena,  Valparaíso,  Rancagua,  Talca,  Chillán,  Concepción, 
Temuco, Valdivia, Puerto Montt, Coyhaique, Punta Arenas and Santiago. The data were 
generated from information from the National Statistics Institute, the Superintendency of 
Pension Fund Managers (taxable income series), annual reports and public information on 
the main supermarket chains in Chile and information that these chains provided (market 
share by city, new stores and acquisition of stores or chains). 
The price data by city were obtained from the Chilean National Statistics Institute’s 
(INE) price yearbooks.
3 The price yearbooks report average monthly prices for 95 foods in 
16  Chilean  cities,  but  only  51  are  in  all  the  price  yearbooks  for  the  period  under 
consideration. Thus, these 51 goods constitute our bundle, and all are sold by supermarkets. 





To begin, the base equation was estimated using the HH index as the concentration 
indicator.  We estimated our panel data using a random-effect method.  The Hausman test 
indicated  that  the  random  effect  estimation  cannot  be  rejected,  denoting  orthogonality 
between the city-fixed effect and the explanatory variables.  The values from the Hausman 
                                                 
3 The National Statistics Institute collects and calculates the national rate of inflation. In the case of Chile, 
these figures are highly reliable and easily verifiable.  
4 See Appendix 1 for both the goods and the weighting of these goods in our bundle. 10   
 
tests are provided in Appendix 2.
5  The unit root test was also performed, which confirmed 
that the variables used are stationary (the test values are presented in Appendix 3
6).  
  The results are presented in Table 1. Equation 1 shows that the local concentration 
in each city as compared to Santiago, measured using the HH index, has a positive and 
statistically  significant  impact  on  local  prices.    In  other  words,  the  local  concentration 
would be associated with market power in the corresponding city.  Local unemployment 
appears  to  be  statistically  significant,  with  a  negative  sign,  as  expected.    Income  is 
statistically not significant. 
The  variable  it HH   is  replaced  by  it C2   in  equation  2  of  the  same  table.    The 
it C2 variable is stationary, like the other variables used.  The results obtained after running 
the regression with C2 are very similar to those obtained with the HH index.  In fact, both 
measures of concentration are statistically significant and have a positive impact on price.  
This  reveals  that  the  results  for  local  concentration  are  robust  and  independent  of  the 









                                                 
5 Appendix 2 summarizes the results of the Hausman test for all regressions made later in the paper. 





Estimations by random effects 
Dependent Variable: Relative Price
Independent Variables 1 2
Relative Income 0.083 0.082
(0.033)** (0.035)**
Relative Unemployment -0.009 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006)









2 Within 0.1918 0.1347
R
2 Between 0.3384 0.3429
R
2 Overall 0.2708 0.2135
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




Given  the  little  difference  in  results  and  the  greater  conceptual  value  of  the 
Herfindahl–Hirschmann  index,  the  choice  was  made  to  continue  using  the  variable  in 
successive equations. 
 The  regressions  in  Table  1  indicate  that  concentration  has  a  positive  and 
statistically significant impact on price.  Nonetheless, concentration is just one part of the 
story on prices in this industry.  Indeed, prior literature (Lira et al., op. cit.; Díaz et al., 
2008) shows that the major chains entering cities has been accompanied by substantial 
price drops for goods that supermarkets sell.  This fact must be included in the analysis. 12   
 
In order to be able to fully understand the way in which the supermarket industry 
behaves by city, it is important to include the fact that the major national chains (DyS and 
Cencosud) have been implementing an aggressive expansion to cities in recent years, either 
via acquisitions, mergers or new supermarkets.  Therefore, the question to be asked is what 
role  do  the  major  national  chains  play  in  determining  local  prices  by  city?    It  is  also 
interesting  to  determine  whether  the  major  national  chains  behave  the  same  as,  or 
differently from, the major local chains. 
The relative market concentration variable is substituted in regression 1 of Table 2 
by  one  that  measures  the  expansion  or  share  attained  by  the  two  leading  national 
supermarket chains in the respective city ( it E ), namely: 
 
it t i it it it E D P ε λ µ φ δ α + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + =           (2)   
 
Note that while  it E , which we call expansion, measures the share of the two leading 
national chains in city i in month t, the two measurements used above ( it C2  and  it HH ) are 
measures of concentration in the respective cities, regardless of who the participants are.  
The new equation (with  it E ) was also estimated using random effect method, given the 
results of the respective Hausman test.  The variable  it E  is also stationary. 
The results of the estimation of equation (2) are presented in regression 1 of Table 2.  
The share of the two major national chains (DyS and Cencosud) in each city is found to 
have  a  negative  effect  on  local  prices.  The  coefficient  is  statistically  significant.    This 
means  that  the  expansion  of  the  major  supermarket  chains  to  cities  has  the  effect  of 13   
 
reducing the prices of goods that are sold in supermarkets.  The evidence is consistent with 
the evidence found by Lira et. al. (op. cit.). 
There could be two reasons why the expansion of major national chains to cities 
reduces local prices.  The first is that the expansion of these chains to cities may be nothing 
but a deconcentration of the local industries as the number of local players rises and the 
industry  deconcentrates  as  a  result.    If  this  were  the  case,  what  would  ultimately  be 
occurring is that the expansion variable would be a measure of deconcentration, something 
like the inverse of the HH variable used in the previous regressions. Hence, in this case, it 
would be natural for the coefficient to be negative since it is simply another way of looking 
at the same thing.
7   The second possible cause has to do with the economies of scale of the 
major domestic chains.  These chains use huge distribution centers that supply many cities 
simultaneously.  Information technology has meant significant savings on logistics so they 
have been able to reduce optimal inventories.  The major chains have thus attained new 
economies of scale in inventory management which have, by the effect of competition, 
reduced  prices  of  goods  to  consumers.    So  in  the  second  explanation,  the  negative 
coefficient of the expansion variable is due to the arrival of a major national retailer to a 
city that brings with it a more efficient inventory management (new economies of scale) or 
lower costs, which helps reduce prices. 
In  order  to  determine  whether  the  expansion  of  major  chains  is  just  a 
deconcentration of the industry or there are other factors involved in the effect on prices 
(economies  of  scale),  a  new  regression  was  run  that  contained  both  variables 
simultaneously:  Concentration ( it HH ) and expansion ( it E ).  The results of the estimation 
                                                 
7 Gómez-Lobo and González (2007) argue along these lines. 14   
 
with a random effect panel are shown in regression 2 of Table 2.  On the one hand, the 
coefficients  for  both  variables  HH  and  expansion  (E)  are  seen  to  remain  virtually 
unchanged as compared to the cases in which they were run separately; and on the other 
hand, those variables maintain their high statistical significance.  This indicates that the 
expansion variable is not the inverse of the HH variable, but rather a different variable that 
captures the effect of economies of scale of the major domestic chains.  Therefore, our 
result validates the theory on the transmission of economies of scale of the major national 
chains to cities to which they expand.   
 
Table 2 
Estimations by random effects  
Dependent Variable: Relative Price
Independent Variables 1 2
Relative Income 0.081 0.087
(0.033)** (0.033)***
Relative Unemployment -0.012 -0.011
(0.006)** (0.006)*
Relative expansion of mayor -0.041 -0.029
 national chains (0.004)*** (0.004)***







2 Within 0.1837 0.2150
R
2 Between 0.4565 0.4961
R
2 Overall 0.3048 0.3588
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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An exercise: The behavior of the main local chain 
  An  additional  exercise  was  conducted  to  attain  a  greater  understanding  of  the 
behavior of the supermarket industry.  This exercise consisted of studying the behavior of 
the main local chain. A priori, it could be expected that the main local firm has certain 
degree of market power over local prices, which would be consistent with the positive 
coefficient  of  the  local  concentration  variable  in  previous  regressions.    An  additional 
variable was thus added to the above equation, namely the relative share (in sales) of the 
dominant firm on the local market ( L C1 ).  The new regression (3) is the following:  
 
  it t i it it it it it L C E HH D P ε λ µ ω φ λ δ α + + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 1     (3)   
 
  The  results  of  the  estimation  using  a  random  effect  method  are  presented  in 
regression 1 of Table 3.  The coefficient of the share of the major local firm is found to be 
negative and statistically significant while the concentration and expansion variables for the 
major chains continue to have the same sign, magnitude and statistical significance.  As 
explained above, it may seem to be counterintuitive that the share of the major local chain 
has a negative coefficient.  In fact, consistent with the positive local concentration sign 
(HH), one would tend to think that the major local firm would also raise prices as its market 
share increases, which does not occur.   One potential reason for this unexpected outcome 
is that this variable has dissimilar effects, depending on whether or not major national firms 
are present in the city where it dominates.  It could thus be thought that in those cities 
where the major national chains do not do business, the major local supermarket takes 
advantage of its position and its market power.  On the other hand, in cities where those 16   
 
chains are present, the major local firm must adapt to a more competitive environment and 
behave differently, following the path that is forged by the major domestic chains  and 
lowering its prices. 
  In order to prove this potential duality in behavior of the variable representing the 
relative share of the dominant firm on the local market ( it L C1 ), it is separated into two 
different variables since it cannot be determined from equation (3) whether the behavior of 
the local dominant firm is different when there is no competition from the major national 
chains  as  compared  to  the  situation  when  at  least  one  is  there  to  compete.    A  new 
variable, it L DC1 , is thus constructed that adopts the value of  it L C1  if the major national 
chains do not participate on that market (i.e. if it E  is equal to zero), and of zero when they 
do ( it E > 0).  Equation 2 in Table 3 adds this new variable.  The estimation was made using 
a random effect panel. 
  This time the sign is positive and statistically  significant, which is the expected 
result because it indicates that there is a powerful local firm that does not feel threatened by 
nationally operated chains and takes advantage of its greater market power to raise prices.  
Its effect goes in the same direction as the concentration variable and tends to strengthen its 










Estimations by random effects  
 
Dependent Variable: Relative Price
Independent Variables 1 2
Relative Income 0.087 0.099
(0.033)*** (0.032)***
Relative Unemployment -0.013 -0.008
(0.006)** (0.006)
Relative expansion of mayor national  -0.035 -0.014
chains (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Relative Herfindahl Index 0.019 0.014
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Relative share of the dominant firm  -0.002
on the local market (0.001)***
Relative share of dominant firm  0.003
on the local market (if no major chains 






2 Within 0.2226 0.2348
R
2 Between 0.4191 0.5498
R
2 Overall 0.3222 0.4085
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
In  order  to  corroborate  this  result,  a  new  variable  ( it L CC1 )  was  created  that 
measures the share attained by a local firm when there is only one of the major supermarket 
chains on that market.  Therefore, this variable has a zero value when  it E  = 0 and the value 
of  it L C1  if  it E > 0, i.e. if at least one of the major chains are present in that city. 
The results are shown in Table 4.  The regression was run using random effects.  
The results corroborate the effect found in the previous regression.  The share of the main 18   
 
local chain has a negative sign and is statistically significant when it operates on a market 
where at least one of the major national chains is present.  This result suggests that the main 
local chain does not behave just one way in response to competition.  If the major national 
chains are present, then the dominant local firm adopts their behavior and reduces prices.  If 
they are not, then it uses the market power attained by its dominant position and raises 
prices.  In the end, these regressions confirm that the major national chains cause price 
reductions in cities where they are present that are not related solely to the fact that they 
might be deconcentrating the industry (which may be true for certain specific cities). 
 
Table 4 
Estimation by random effects  






Relative expansion of mayor -0.015
national chains (0.004)***
Relative Herfindahl Index 0.015
(0.002)***
Relative share of dominant firm on the -0.006
 local market (if major companies 











Standard errors in parentheses  
                                   ***Significant at 1% ** significant at 5%  *significant at 10% 
 




V. Major national chains:  acquisitions and entry 
  According to our results, since the expansion of the major chains to cities is the 
market structure variable that predominates in price behavior, it is interesting to study it in 
further detail.  One possibility is to open it up according to the way in which that expansion 
has occurred, i.e., by making a distinction between the greater share attained from the new 
hypermarkets  entering  cities  and  the  one  obtained  by  purchasing  existing  chains  or 
supermarkets.  The purpose is to detect whether there is any difference in price behavior 
between both strategies. 
For these purposes, the expansion of national chains is replaced in our previous 
equation by series of variables that are intended to show those disaggregated effects.  Two 
entry dummies,  it E D1  and  it E D2 ,  are added as well as two acquisition dummies,  it AC  
and  it AS .   The variable  it E D1  captures when there is just one national chain that begins to 
operate with a hypermarket in the city (it adopts a value of zero when  none of the two 
major national chains is present on the market or when both are there, and a value of one 
when there is just one of the two participating on that market) while it E D2 is a dummy that 
adopts a value of 1 when both national chains operates on the city, and zero otherwise. 
The it AC acquisition dummy captures the inmerge operations and adopts a value of 1 
when there is a purchase of a local chain by a national chain that is already present in the 
city, i.e. both chains involved in the acquisition are present in the city at the time of the 
acquisition.  Therefore, from that moment on, the number of participants is reduced by 1 
(by  the  chain  acquired).    The  variable  adopts  the  value  of  zero  when,  at  the  time  of 20   
 
acquisition, there is just one or none of the chains involved in the transaction in the city.  
This value remains the same over time as of that moment.  The idea behind this variable is 
to  capture  what  happens  with  prices  when  two  chains  already  existing  in  the  city  are 
merged by an acquisition, apart from the effect caused by the increase in concentration. 
The  it AS   acquisition  dummy  takes  into  account  the  outmerge  transactions  and 
adopts a value of 1 when just 1 of the 2 chains involved in the transaction is present in a 
city and zero otherwise.    The variable remains the same over time.  A review of the 
acquisitions that took place in Chile in the period of time studied reveals that just two are 
worthy of analysis.  One is the purchase of Santa Isabel by Jumbo (now Cencosud) in July 
2003 and the second is the purchase of Las Brisas, also by Cencosud, in April 2004.    The 
remaining acquisitions that took place in the industry in this period are minor and were not, 
therefore, considered in this study.  
As a result, the equation to be estimated is: 
 
it t i it it it it it it it AS AC E D E D HH D P ε λ µ θ κ η χ λ δ α + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 2 1           (4) 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of equation (4) with a random effect 
method (see Appendix 2).  The concentration variable (HH) continues to have the same 
signs and statistical significance, which reflects how robust the results are.  The entry 1 
dummy, which captures the entry of a major national chain when there is none present, has 
a  negative  sign  and  is  statistically  significant.    Prices  fall  even  further  when  the  first 
hypermarket of the second national chain enters (meaning both operates in the city), i.e., 21   
 
competition intensifies (entry 2 dummy). The coefficients of the concentration and entry 
variables show that overall the entry effect dominates, thus reducing prices. 
The effect of acquisitions is seen to be different if both chains are doing business on 
the market prior to the transaction than if just one is.  Prices fall if just one chain was 
present in the city at the time the acquisition was made while they rise if both were present.  
The behavior of the outmerge variable is interesting since the only reason for prices to fall 
after  the  transaction  is  that  now  the  same  company  that  was  formerly  present  is 
experiencing  lower  costs.    These  lower  costs  must  come  either  from  the  creation  of 
economies of scale  generated by the acquisition or the transmission of lower operating 
costs  of  the  buyer.    The  inmerge  dummy,  on  its  part,  has  a  positive  and  statistically 
significant coefficient that is explained by the greater power on the local market created by 
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Table 5 






Relative Herfindahl Index 0.017
(0.002)***
1 chain entry dummy -0.029
(0.006)***
2 chains entry dummy -0.024
(0.003)***
Acquisition with chains present: 0.018
inmerge (0.005)***
Acquisition with just one  -0.008










2 Overall 0.3943  
                                   Standard error between parenthesis.  








The last decade has seen profound changes in the supermarket industry in Chile. 
The two largest national chains have expanded all over the country and are reaching new 
cities every year. This expansion has taken place mostly by opening new stores in theses 
cities, but also by the acquisition of other chains. The purpose of this paper has been to 
study the effect of these changes on the prices of goods sold by supermarkets. We use a 
panel with data on 16 cities over the period January 1998–September 2006. Our dependent 
variable is the price of a bundle of food products in the different cities relative to the price 
of the same bundle for Santiago. 
This paper studies the effect of the changes that have occurred in the structure of the 
supermarket industry in Chile on the prices of the goods sold by this sector. We find that 
the  higher  concentration  increases  prices,  but  that  the  expansion  of  the  major  national 
chains  reduces  those  prices.  The  reason  why  the  expansion  of  the  national  chains  to 
different cities has a negative effect on prices is that there are scale economies based on the 
use of information technologies by the largest players in this industry. In particular, this has 
allowed them to operate with centralized distribution centers,  which has translated into 
lower costs and lower prices to consumers. 
When we introduce the share of the major local supermarket chain into the analysis, 
we  find  that  the  effect  of  this  variable  on  prices  depends  on  whether  there  is  a  major 
national chain in that city. If there is no national player, then the local leader increases its 
prices as its share in the market goes up. This is an additional effect to the effect produced 
by the higher concentration of the market. The reason for this behavior is simply the use of 
its greater market power. However, when there is a national player in the city, the local 24   
 
leader cannot raise its prices.  Instead, it simply follows the lead of the national chain and 
lowers prices.  
Finally, we investigated the differentiated effects of a national chain entering a city 
by opening a new supermarket or by buying an existing one. The entry of a national chain 
to a city lowers prices. When the second chain enters, prices fall even further. However, 
when a national supermarket chain acquires a local chain, the effect on prices will depend 
on whether both chains are already present in the city. If only one chain was operating in 
the  city  before  the  acquisition,  then  prices  fall  after  the  acquisition  takes  place.  The 
explanation for this result is that the new supermarket has lower costs (because of greater 
economies  of  scale).  However,  if  both  chains  were  operating  in  the  city  before  the 
acquisition, then prices in that city will increase. In this case, the effect of greater market 
power (not captured by the concentration variable) more than offsets the effect of the lower 
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1 Standard Bread (kg) 2.31 27 Osobuco (beef) (10kg) 0.16
2 Carbonated soft drink (2 lt) 1.80 28 Onions, new or long life (kg) 0.16
3 Brisket (beef) (kg) 0.89 29 Milan lettuce (1) 0.16
4 Potatoes (kg) 0.62 30 Tomatoe sauce (250g jar) 0.16
5 Milk (lt) 0.60 31 Hass Avocados (kg) 0.14
6 Whole prepared chicken (kg) 0.47 32 Veal sausages (20) 0.13
7 Vegetable oil (lt) 0.37 33 Jelly (250g) 0.13
8 Sugar (kg) 0.37 34 Unseasoned pork ribs (kg) 0.12
9 Powdered milk (1 kg) 0.34 35 Normal flour (500 kg) 0.12
10 Whipped yoghurt (175g) 0.33 36 Teabags (20) 0.11
11 Eggs 12 uds. 0.30 37 Satandard tea (250g) 0.10
12 Rice, grade 2 (kg) 0.29 38 Salted Butter (kg) 0.10
13 Spaguetti Nº5 (400g) 0.25 39 Carrots (bundle) 0.10
14 Beef (kg) 0.24 40 Mineral water, carbonated (1.6 lt) 0.09
15 Boiled ham (kg) 0.23 41 White beans (kg) 0.08
16 Lean beef sirloin (kg) 0.22 42 Lemons (kg) 0.08
17 Standard Bread (no packaging, kg) 0.20 43 Tinned tuna (184g) 0.07
18 Margarine (250g) 0.20 44 Milk additive (400g) 0.06
19 Pisco 35% alcohol (750cc) 0.19 45 Tinned peaches (590g) 0.05
20 White wine (lt) 0.19 46 Medium white cabbage (1) 0.05
21 Oranges (kg) 0.19 47 Lentils 5mm (kg) 0.04
22 Rump roast (beef) (kg) 0.19 48 Garlic (3 units) 0.04
23 Apples (kg) 0.18 49 Tinned horse-eye jack (fish) (425g) 0.04
24 Bananas (kg) 0.18 50 Table salt with added iodine (kg) 0.03
25 Coffee (170g) 0.18 51 Crushed oats (400g) 0.03
26 Pork chops (kg) 0.16
Total selected bundle 13.82




Appendix 2: Hausman Tests 
Test p-Value
Table 1
Ecuation 1 4.36 0.2254
Ecuation 2 4.22 0.2389
Table 2
Ecuation 1 3.06 0.3829
Ecuation 2 3.73 0.4435
Table 3
Ecuation 1 4.47 0.4837
Ecuation 2 2.00 0.8498
Table 4
Ecuation 1 2.85 0.7234
Table 5
Ecuation 1 17.27 0.3027
 






Appendix 3: Unit Root Tests 
   Im-Pesaran-Shin  Maddala- Wu 
   p-value  Prob>χ χ χ χ
2 
       
Relative Prices  0.009  0.0222 
Relative Income  0.000  0.0533 
Relative 
Unemployment 
0.000  0.0000 
Relative HH Index  0.008  0.0078 
Relative Local C2   0.045  0.0317 
Relative Expansion  0.068  0.0659 
Relative Local C1   0.008  0.0093 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 